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NOTE AND COMMENT 
PcBLIC UTILITY v ALUATIONS AND RATSS.-In comparing the reports of 
the public utility commissions with the decisions of the courts on questions 
of valuation of public utilities, nothing is more striking than this-that as 
time goes on the commissions are growingly impatient of the cost of repro-
duction theory, while the courts still insist there is no inflexible method of 
fixing value, but continue to prefer largely figures as to supposed reproduc-
tion cost. This attitude of the commissions is remarkable in view of the 
fact that every finding may be carried to the courts for review and possible 
reversal. The Illinois Commission reluctantly obeyed the direct orders of 
the Supreme Court to consider cost of reproduction, but refuses to treat 
that as the only basis. Re Springfield Consol. Ry. Co., P. U. R. 1920 E. 474, 
480. The Interstate Commerce Commission ruled that it was practically 
impossible for it to find such value in the appraisal of lands of railroads as 
ordered by Congress in 1912. But the Supreme Court said it must do so 
because Congress had ordered it. U. S. v. lllterstate Com. Com., 252 U. S. 
178. This was taken by many as an approval by the Supreme Court of the 
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Cost of Reproduction as the base of value, but that question was not in-
volved. 
The North Dakota Commission believes that wherever possible in cases 
involving a rate basis original cost data should be considered in finding 
present value, but finds the facts as to original cost not usually available. 
Fargo v. Union Light Co., P. U. R. 1920 A 764 It therefore falls back on 
the broad· generalizations of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S • .¢6. Those generaliza-
tions were doubtless wise in 1898, but in 1921, valuation should be on a much 
more definite basis. The Vermont Commission regarded estimated cost of 
reproduction new as defective, even if allowance be made for depreciation, 
first, because based on abnormally high costs of labor and materials, and sec-
ond, because security holders should be entitled to a reasonable return upon 
investment. Therefore effort should be made to determine actual cost. Re 
Colonial Power & L. Co., P. U. R. 1920 A 215. However, original cost ·alone, 
even if known, cannot be taken as a proper basis, says the Commission in 
Milne v. Montpelier & Barre L. & P. C~., P. U. R. 1920 E 558. This is the 
attitude of many courts. It does not seem logical to the Michigan Commis-
sion that the customers of a public utility should be required to pay a higher 
rate merely to enable i utility, without the expenditure of a single dollar 
towards an increase of its capital investment, to profit from a high level of 
prices. Holland v. Maguire, P. U .. R. 1920 B 149. It might be added that 
it is very logical to ask the users to pay. the utility a return on capital that is 
invested at present high prices in order to furnish proper service, even though 
prices later may fall to a far lower level. The Tennessee Commission based 
rates upon a fair and adequate return upon the capital which had been in-
vested in the property. Where the books did not show this, it was determined 
by cost of reproduction at the dates of installation, i. e., by the historical, and 
not the present, cost of reproduction. Re Receivers Memphis St. R. Co., 
P. U. R. 1920 C 277. Fortunately in this case the books furnished reliable 
information as to actual cost in most instances. To the same effect is Re 
Roanoke Waterworks Co., (Va.), P. U. R. 1920 C 745, quoting the opinion 
of Hon. Chas. E. Hughes in the Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. Case, P. U. R. 
1918 F 335, an opinion that has been more often approved in recent cases 
before the Commissions than the decision of any court. It is quoted in nearly 
all the Commission cases herein referred to, e. g., by the Utah Commission 
in Re Utah Gas and Coke Co., P. U. R. 1920 C 854, holding that there can-
not be a disturbing of valuations theretofore fixed every time a change occurs 
in unit prices. See also Re Southern Pac. Co., (Nev.), P. U. R. 1920 F 725, 
775, and Re Douglas Co. L. & W. Co., (Oreg.), P. U. R. 1920 E 66], 674, 
showing the effect of the cost of reproduction method in placing public 
utilities on the plane of pri~te speculative enterprises. Preference for the 
original cost method, if a single test is to be applied, is expressed by the 
New Hampshire Commission in Concord G. L. Co. referred to in P. U. R. 
Mar. 3, 1921, vi. 
In Maires v. Flatbush Co., P. U. R. 1920 E 930, the New York Commis-
sion, First District, gives a long and careful discussion of bases of rate 
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regulation, especially as affected "in the present juncture of universal up-
heaval." It points out that "value" of property as a rate base is not "value" 
as applied to private property, and denies the deductions made from the 
decisions as to the reproduction cost. That basis was resorted to because 
actual expenditures could not be determined, or had not been prudently 
made. It was a mere "rule of convenience", and "original cost of property 
as a controlling factor in a rate base has been approved" by certain New 
York courts. The advantages of the "Actual Cost" method under the uni-
form system of accounts are pointed out, and the trend of decisions by regu-
latory commissions in favor of giving controlling weight to that method is 
dwelt upon, with many citations. The Commission for the Second District 
also approves, especially under the New York statute, the capital actually 
invested as the basis of return .. Re Sea Cliff, etc. Gas Co., P. U. R. 1921 
A 2II. 
In Re York County Water Co., P. U. R. 1921 A 439, the Maine Com-
mission claims that a very substantial number of commissions now believe 
that "the money actually invested in an honest and prudent manner" is "a 
better basis for the ascertainment of fair value" than "an attempt to apply 
the reproduction less depreciation theory", which in many instances results 
"in ridiculous exaggerations of .actual or probable conditions". This idea 
was further elaborated and insisted upon by the same Commission in Re 
Lewiston Gas L. Co., P. U. R. 1921 A 561, 571. In Re La Porte Gas & E. 
C(}., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1920 F 586, 594-8, the Commission objected to givi_ng 
much weight to cost of reproduction at present abnormal prices, the weight 
to vary with the degree of departure from normal cost, the greater the 
departure the less the weight. Many of the mental processes in fixing going 
value are described as "whimsical adventure in an unblazed forest of specu-
lation." In Re La Porte Gas & E. Co., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1921 A 824, 843, 
85g, the Commission regards with concern, as inconsistent, unsound, un-
economic, and inequitable, the New Jersey case of Elizabethtown Gas L. Co. 
v. Pub. Utility Comni., III At!. 729, post. See also Re Central Union Tel. 
Co., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1921 B 813, 825. Present cost investment was used as 
a base on the facts of the case in Re Houghto1i Cout!Jy Tra,ction Co., 
(Mich,), P. U. R. 1920 E 350, was regarded as worthy of serious considera-
tion in Re Chesap~ke & Potomac Tel. Co., (Va.), P. U. R. 1920 F 49, 88, rec-
ognizing the wide disagreement between courts and commissions, and was con-
sidered the most equitable basis in Re Chesapeake & PQtomac Tel. Co., (W. 
Va.), P. U. R. 1921 B 97, 108: The Illinois Commission, while compelled 
under the decision of the Supreme Court to consider cost of reproduction, 
refused to base a value on that without a showing of original cost. The 
Supreme Court has taken a similar stand, flatly refusing to take cost of re-
production as the sole basis of value. State Pub. Utilities Com. v. Springfield 
G. & E. Co., (Ill.), 125 N. E. 8g1. An interesting history of the cost of re-
production method, at first advocated by the public and repudiated by the 
utilities, now insisted upon by the utilities and decried by the public, is found 
in Re St. ]Qseph Ry. L. H. & P. Co., (Mo.), P. U. R. 1920 A 5.ia In. 
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Whitehead v. Niagara Falls G. & E. Co., P. U. R. 1920 C 265, the New York 
Commission, Second District, refused to add to the investment actually made 
an increase based on advanced costs of present day construction. 
It must be admitted, however, that there is very little in recent decisions 
of the courts to show any considerable judicial trend in this same direction, 
though present conditions often compel the courts to restrict severely the 
use of cost of reproduction. In Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 26-; Fed. 
231, Learned Hand, J., does not hesitate to take the burr in his firm grasp. 
He scorns the statement that cost of reproduction and original cost are each 
elements to be considered, as meaning nothing unless that the two are to be 
averaged, which no one will support. He seems right a,bout this, but he does 
not shrink from the full acceptance of cost of reproduction as a rate base, 
with a continued, but not quite continuous, reappraisal of plants, and rising 
and falling of rates. That present value is hard to prove is no answer. He 
is prepared to allow the "fallen dollar", by which "the company gains noth-
ing, the customers lose nothing." 
In Elizabethtown Gas L. c(). v. Pub. Util. Com., III A~l. 729, Justice 
Swayze, quoting Lincoln Gas & E. Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, plants the 
New Jersey court squarely for allowing present values, and considers that 
the dollar has depreciated one half, while interest rates have practically 
doubled. Does he approve doubling .the fair value, and then doubling the 
rate on this doubled base value? The decision is cited with approval in St. 
Joseph R. L. H. & P. Co. v. Pub-.. Sero. Com., 268 Fed. 267, which disap-
proved the method of valuation adopted by the Commission relying on orig-
inal cost when obtain;ible. But see the severe criticisms by the Indiana Com-
mission in Re La Porte Gas & E. Co1, P. U. R. 1921 A 824, 250-200. In 
Housto1i Elec. Co. v. Houston, 265 Fed. 36o, the court disapproved confining 
the plaintiff to the cost basis, arid the Michigan court in Detroit v. Michigan 
R. Co., 177 N. W. 3o6, approved the cost of reproduction less depreciation 
method of appraisal for rate purposes. The actual cost was shown to be 
$7,299,148, and estimates of present value were $8,000,000, $10,913,191 and 
$12,974937 I There was a record of over two thousand pages. Valuation 
methods with such results at such cost leave something to be desired. In 
Kings County L. Co. v. Lewis, 18o N. Y. Suppl. 570, the New York Supreme 
Court, New York County, refused to agree with the contention of the utility 
for cost of reproduction, or of the city for actual original cost, as the proper 
basis, or to admit that there could be any hard and fast rule. To the same 
effect is People v. Pub. Sero. Comm., 186 N. Y. Suppl. 177. But in Winona 
v. Wisconsin-Minnesota L. & P. Co., (Fed.), P. U. R. 1921 A 146, the court 
flatly holds a rate ordinance must be considered with reference to present 
day, and not pre-war values. 
The conclusion of this review of recent cases is that the Commissions, 
working at first hand with the practical problems of valuation generally lean 
more and~ more decidedly toward fixing value-so-called-of public utilities 
on prudent investment, largely, and in not a few cases wholly. The courts, 
on the other hand, still wallow in the uncertainties of the rule, which is 
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scarcely a rule at all, of S1nyth v. Ames, making value a question of judg-
ment. In the cases, judgments continue to vary as widely as ever. The 
courts are probably too firmly committed to a consideration of various ele-
ments to expect them to adopt the definite rule of fixing base values on pru-
dent investment. Whether legislatures will step in here, and whether a legis-
lative act making prudent investment the basis would be held to be consti-
tutional is for the future to reveal. For a fuller discussion of these methods 
of valuation see 15 M1cH. L. Rr:v. 205. E. C. G. 
Due PROCESS oF LAW IN PROCE1>URE. - There are two classes of cases 
which may arise under the "due process" provisions of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, so far as rules of procedure 
are concerned. One embraces cases of new remedial processes which may 
be criticized as too radical. The other consists of cases of old processes 
which may be criticized as obsolete and out of harmony with prevailing con-
ceptions of justice. Due process may thus be said to fill the wide space be-
tween those innovations which carry us so far away from established meth-
ods as to remove the safeguards which are deemed essential to the protection 
of person and property, and those ancient remedies which enlightened modern 
opinion condemns as barbarous. 
Most of the cases which have come before the courts belong to the first 
class, and in dealing with them the problem has been how to determine the 
point at which departure from settled usage becomes so great as to under-
mine what are considered the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 
Certainly the procedure in England at the time of the .emigration cannot be 
"fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket only to be 
unloosed by constitutional amendment". Twining v. New Jersey, 2u U. S. 
78, IOI. 
But the cases falling into the second class are much less numerous. It 
has been said that a process is due process of law if it can show the sanction 
of settled usage both in England and this country. Hurtado v. California, 
no U. S. 516. It would seem reasonable, however, to assume that the settled 
usage might become so remote in point of time and so out of harmony with 
contemporary ideas, as to cease to enjoy the quality of due process. 
This argument was made in Miedr.eich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236, 
against the ancient rule that a sheriff's return cannot be falsified in the action 
in which it is made, and that a party not served with process, who is thereby 
deprived of his day in court, may nevertheless lose his property by judicial 
sale on a default judgment based on a false return, without being allowed 
to show that he was never in fact served. It appeared, however, that this 
rule of the ancient common law was still currently adhered to in a number 
of American states, and the Supreme Court of the United States felt itself 
unable to say that the rule was inconsistent with the due process clause of 
the 14th Amendment. 
A more striking case of the same type has just come before the Supreme 
Court. In Ownbey v. Joh11 Pierpont Morga1~, et al., U. S. Sup. Ct., April 
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II, 1921, No. 99, an action was commenced by attachment in Delaware against 
a non-resident. The defendant attempted to appear, but was refused the 
right to do so unless he put in special bail to the amount of the value of the 
property held under the attachment. This was the statutory rule in Dela-
ware, and the defendant, who was unable to put in the special bail, attacked 
the rule as operating to deprive him of property without due process of law. 
It appeared that this harsh rule was derived from the Custom of London 
in foreign attachment, and had been brought over to America by the colonists, 
and that in Delaware it could show statutory continuity down to the present 
time. The court cites a number of cases from other seaboard states where 
the Custom of London also obtained a foothold, but an investigation of the 
statutory history of the rule in those states seems to indicate that in every 
one of them the rule long since succumbed to the progress of enlightened 
civilization and passed over the Styx into the shadowy land of legal tradition 
where the ghosts of ancient laws wander restlessly forever. Sodom was 
thought worthy of being saved if but ten righteous men could be found 
there, and it is possible that our constitution should be equally charitable to-
ward any medieval custom which could show the endorsement of even a 
single modern jurisdiction. But the court took a rather cheerless view of 
the purpose of the constitution, saying that, "However desirable it is that 
the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time, it cannot 
rightly be said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal and 
self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries 
no mandate for particular measures of reform." This sounds like the ex-
clusion from the purview of the constitution of practically all cases of out-
grown processes, and would probably justify the current use of trial by 
battle. But the court may not have intended to take such broad ground 
against rising standards of justice. Its decision is probably correct, but its 
r~ons seem to accord too high a degree of respectability to the lingering 
relics of a ruder age. E. R. S. 
PROI'lTS FROM SAL<: 01" CAPITAL ASSETS AS INCOMt: TAXABLt UNDER 
SIXTESNTH A:~n:NDMtNT.-The Supreme Court of the United States has taken 
another step in clearing up the legal concept of income. In four cases, 
decided March 28, 1921, the troublesome problem of whether or not profits 
arising from the sale of capital assets shall be considered as income for the 
purposes of the Income Tax was settled. These cases all arose under the 
Income Tax act of 1916, as amended in 1917, 39 Stat., ch. 463, p. 756, 40 Stat., 
ch. 63, p. 300, and were all suits to recover taxes assessed, and paid under 
protest. All involved the question of the constitutionality of the assessment 
under the 16th Amendment, the contention of the taxpayer in each case being 
.that the fund taxed was not "income" within the meaning of the Amend-
ment. In Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, the plaintiff was 
trustee under a will of property, the net income of which was to be paid to 
the testator's widow for life, and after her death, to the children until each 
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should become twenty-five years of age, when each was to receive his share 
of the trust fund. Stock dividends and accretions of selling values, under 
the will, were to be considered as principal, and not income, and the trustee 
was given full dominion over the estate. Certain stock, worth $561,7g8 on 
March 1, 1913, the effective date of the Amendment, was sold in 1917 for 
$1,2&>,996.64, and the difference was taxed as income. The Supreme Court 
held that it was taxable, although it was not in a course of dealing with 
stocks, but a mere isolated sale. In Eldorado Coal Co. v. Mager, the plain-
tiff corporation sold its plant for cash in 1917, distributing the cash among 
the stockholders, the corporation not being dissolved, because of unsettled 
liabilities outstanding. Adding to the market value of March 1, 1913, the cost 
of additions, and subtracting the depreciation, the appreciation in value after 
that date was some $6,ooo, on which assessment was made, and the tax paid. 
It was held that this was taxable, as in Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Smieta11ka. In Goodrich v. Edwards, the plaintiff bought stock in 1912 for 
$500, which was worth $695 on March 1, 1913, and sold it in 1916 for $13,-
931.22. He was taxed on the difference between the value on March 1, 1913, 
and the selling price, and the Court sustained the tax. He also exchanged 
stock in 1912 for other stock then worth $291,6oo. On March 1, 1913, it had 
gone down to $148,000 and he sold it in 1916 for $269,000. He was taxed on 
the difference between the value of March 1, 1913, and the selling value, but 
the Court held that the Income Tax covered only actual gains, and here was 
a loss. In Walsh v. Brewster, the plaintiff, who occasionally bought and sold 
stocks to change his investments, bought some stock in 1909 which fell in 
value by March 1, 1913. He sold it for what he paid for it, and the Court 
held that there having been no actual gain, there was nothing to tax. He 
also had bought some stock in 1902 for $231,300, the value of which on March 
1, 1913, was $164,48o, and sold it in 1916 for $276,150. He was taxed on the 
difference between the value on March 1, 1913, and the selling price. The 
lower court held that it was, in any event, a conversion of capital assets, 
and not taxable income, but the Supreme Court held that the actual gain to 
the seller was income; i. e., the difference, here, between the purchase price 
and selling price. 
The Court in these cases followed its own dictum in Eisner v. Macomber, 
252 U. S. 189, 207, where it gave a definition of income, saying "Income may 
be defined as a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through sale or 
conversion of capital assets." That profit from the sale of capital assets was 
taxable as income was specifically held under the corporation excise tax of 
1909. Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189. The Court felt 
bound by the interpretation of income given in the cases under the excise 
tax, although it is arguable that the word "income" might have a broader 
meaning under a corporation excise tax than under an income tax calculated 
to apply to private individuals as well as to corporations. As Justice Holmes 
says in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, "A word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in 
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colo1 and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it 
is used." It seems clear that the Court would decide that what was income 
for the tax-collector is not income for a life tenant under a trust. See 
Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337; Thayer v. Burr, 201 N. Y. 155; and see 
Ta:>: Commissioner v. Putnam, 2ZJ Mass. 522, at page 529. 
Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63, was a case which came up under the 
income tax of 1867. The act provided for levying annually a tax on gains, 
profits and income for the year derived from any source, and provided that 
in estimating the gains and profits, there should be included gains realized 
within the year preceding the collection of the tax. The plaintiff exchanged 
some notes for United States bonds in 1865, and sold them in 186g, at a profit, 
and paid the tax on this profit, under protest. He was allowed to recover 
the amount paid, because the increase in value developed over a series of 
years, and so, according to the Act, could not be considered as income for 
any one year. According to the terms of that Act, it was perhaps, not 
necessary to decide that increase of capital assets, converted into cash, was 
not income, but the court in that case, nevertheless, took the view that such 
conversion could not be considered as income. The lower court, in Walsh 
v. Brewster,-Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed. 207-took the view that the mean-
ing of income in the 16th Amendment was no broader than in the Act of 
1867. Similarity in wording would in,dicate that Congress at least had that 
act in mind. 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6or, decided that 
taxes on income from real or personal property were direct taxes ; as being 
in reality the same as a tax on the source itself. Other sorts of income, such 
as salaries, were considered to be subject only to an excise tax, to which the 
rule of uniformity applies. The 16th Amendment did not give Congress 
power to lay any new kind of tax, but simply removed the necessity of 
apportionment, and considering the source from which income is derived. 
Uniformity is still necessary, where applicable. Brushaber v. Union Pacific 
Rd. Co., 240 U.S. r, 17-19. In Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, Justice Holmes 
gave the opinion of the court, holding that under the 16th Amendment "stock 
dividends" were not taxable as income, since the shareholder continued to 
have the same interest in the capital assets of the corporation that he had 
before. In Eisner v. Maconiber, 252, U. S. 189, under an act of Congress 
making stock dividends taxable, it was held that they could not be considered 
as income, the court saying that Congress cannot by any definition it may 
adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot alter the Constitution. The court 
said that it was essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 
income, as the term is used in ·the 16th Amendment, and apply the distinction 
with regard to substance, and not form. Justice Holmes dissented here, 
reiterating that, soundly considered, stock dividends were not income, but 
said that the 16th Amendment was broad enough to cover it, so that it could 
be made income under the Amendment. Hence, the problem, according to 
the court, is simply to ascertain just what the term "income" legally defined 
can include. 
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It was decided in Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, that where a corpora-
tion sells out to another corporation, and distributes the proceeds among 
stockholders, if the value on the effective date of the Amendment, is the 
same as the value when liquidated, after the date, there is no taxable income. 
even though the stockholders get double the value of their stock. On the 
other hand, in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, where the corporation de-
clared a dividend on surplus earnings, all of which had accrued before March 
:r, 1913, the dividend declared after that date was taxable, even though made 
up of capital assets, for the dividends were, to the individual, a tangible re-
turn on his stock. And if this dividend were made up partly of stock in an-
other corporation, under the same circumstances, it is taxable; Peabody v. 
Eisner, 247 U. S. 347. See Southern. Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335, 
where it was assumed that the meaning of "income" was the same as in the 
corporation tax of 1909. 
Had there been no corporation excise tax, it seems doubtful if the Su-
preme Court would have included this liquidated increment of value in capital 
assets under income. That it may be desirable to tax it as income, so as to 
save it from the necessity of apportionment, is, of course, of no interest 
to the court. And there can be no problem of double taxation, if one pays 
taxes on dividends, and then again pays taxes on profits from the sale of 
the same stock, perhaps increased in value simply because it regularly paid 
dividends. The court simply wants to find what is income in the commonly 
accepted meaning of that term; yet what is commonly accepted as income is 
itself a well•nigh impossible thing to define. Although the court must find 
an act constitutional if by any reasonable meaning given to it, it can, yet in 
the very nature of the problem, it must differentiate clearly between what 
is and what is not income. 
The court dealt in a high-handed manner with Gray v. Darlington, in 
distinguishing it. The distinction made in Hays v. Gauley Mountain- Coal 
Co. was followed, where it was said that the Act of 1867 did not apply to 
such sales of stock unless the whole transaction was made within the year 
in which the tax was sought to be collected; but the two Acts are much 
alike, save that in the Act of 1916, the tax is levied on income "received" in 
the year, while in" the Act of 1867, it is on income "derived." Inasmuch as 
there can be no income at all until the act of conversion, it would seem that 
it is both "derived" and "received" at that time, so the Acts can hardly be 
distinguished on that ground. In the Darlington case, the court let in profits 
from sales in the course of trade and commerce, although the transactions 
did not begin and end during the year, but did not let in a sale from an iso-
lated transaction. It would seem. that it c·onsidered that such profit was not 
income, and so the court in the principal cases is virtually overruling Gray 
v. Darlingto1~, in calling such profit "income." It hardly seems that the Act 
of 1916 is different enough in its wording from the Act of 1867 to warrant 
saying that Congress has made that income which was not income under the 
former Act, in accordance with the reasoning of Justice Holmes in his dis-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
senting opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, so as to drag it in under the 
Sixteenth Amendment. It seems, rather, that the Supreme Court has, in a 
doubtful situation, redefined income, and has thus made a distinct advance 
in the legal interpretation of the term. If the law as it stands works unjustly, 
it is up to Congress to change it. G. D. C. 
Nr:Gr.1GJ;:Nct oF DRIVJ;:R NOT lMPU'l'J;:D TO Gm:sT.-With the decision of the 
Wisconsin court in Reiter v. Grober, et al., (Wis., 1921), 181 N. W. 739, 
there fell the last stronghold of the doctrine which imputed the negligence 
of the driver of a vehicle to a guest riding with him. The first American 
state to adopt the doctrine first enunciated in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 
us, was the last to throw it overboard. 
To impute the negligence of one person to -another the relation between 
them must be one invoking the principles of agency, or the parties mu~t be 
co-operating in a common or joint en~erprise, or the relation between the 
parties must have been such that the person to whom the negligence is im-
puted must have had the legal right to control the action of the person actu-
ally negligent. I SHURMAN & Ri;:nmr.n, LAw oF NJ;:Gr.1ci;:Ncr:, [6th Ed.], Sec. 
6sa, et seq. 
In Tlwrogood v. Bryan (supra.), an English court first held that a pas-
senger in a public vehicle, though having no control over the driver, must be 
held to be· so identified with the vehicle as to be chargeable with any negli-
gence on the part of the driver which contributed ito an injury inflicted upon 
such passenger by the negligence of a third party. This was but an attempted 
extended application of the old Roman doctrine of identification, and has been 
practically unanimously refused and denied in the United States. Little v. 
Hackett, u6 U. S. 366, 29 L. Ed. 652. In England, too, it was early recog-
nized that the Thorogood decision rested "upon reasons inconclusive and un-
satisfactory'' and the case was over-ruled in The Bernina, 12 Prob. Div. s8, 
13 App. Cas. l. 
While the doctrine was thus met with opposition upon all sides when 
applied to• public conveyances, a remnant of it remained, when the Wisconsin 
court in Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 2¢, 9 Am. Rep. s68, and in Priedeau~ v. 
Mineral Point, 43 Wis. s13, 28 Am. Rep. ssB, adopted it in the case of pas-
sengers riding in private vehicles. This new theory, attacked when first 
enunciated and since as "resting upon no sound legal basis either as to 
agency or identity", Reiter v. Grober (supra), was repudiated by most courts, 
yet followed for a time in Montana and Nebraska. Whittaker v. Helena, 
14 Mont. 124, 3S Pac. 904; Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627, 67 N. 
W. s6g. But Montana repudiated the doctrine in lgo8 in Sherris v. Northern 
Pac. R. Co., SS Mo.nt. l8g, l7S Pac. 26g, and Nebraska dropped even earlier 
in Loso v. Lancaster County, 77 Neb. 466, where the court pointed out that 
the doctrine of imputed negligence cannot be logically applied unless there is 
some privity between driver and guest. Wisconsin stood by the principle 
for which it had become sponsor for more than fifty years, following the 
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Priedeau~ case steadily either by a reaffirmance thereof or under the rule of 
stare decisis. See numerous cases cited in Reiter v. Grober, (s11pra). 
In support of the imputed negligence doctrine it was argued that he who 
voluntarily enters the private conveyance of another voluntarily trusts his 
personal safety in the conveyance to the person in control of it. The volun-
tary acceptance of transportation or carriage, it was reasoned, caused an 
adoption of the conveyance as one's own for the time being, and an assump-
tion of the risk of the skill and care of the person guiding it. To sanction 
this line of argument in the case where the driver is not controlled by or is 
in any sense the agent of the guest is "unauthorized by law and repugnant to 
reason." Union P. R. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174· When a driver invites a 
stranger to ride with him, and the stranger accepts, upon what basis can it 
be said that there has by this transaction been established a relation of master 
and servant, or of principal and agent? Unless the guest is. given control of 
the machine no such relation is created. Dale v. Denver City Tramway Co., 
173 Fed. 787. As one court puts it, ''to create the imputation of negligence, 
the passenger or guest must have assumed such control and direction of the 
vehicle as to be considered in superior possession of it." Duvall v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750. It has even been held that 
merely making suggestions to the driver as to the route to be taken, or warn-
ing the driver of the conveyance of some danger does not amount to suffi-
cient authority or control. Zimmerman v. Union R. Co., 28 N. Y. App. Div. 
445, 51 N. Y. S. I; Bergold v. Nassau Blee~ R. Co., 30 N. Y. App. Div. 
438, 52 N • .Y. S. II. By the trend of authority it is also true that the doctrine 
of imputed negligence will not be applied although driver and guest are fel-
low-servants, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McFall, 75 Ark. 30, 86 S. W. 824, or 
are relatives by blood or marriage. So11thern R. Co. v. King, 128 Ga. 383, 
57 S. E. 687; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Mcintosh, 140 Ind. 261, 38 N. E. 
476. Contra: Vinton v. Plainfield Tp., 208 Mich. 179, 175 N. W. 403, (father 
and son). 
It is interesting to note that a statute imputing the negligence of the 
operator of a motor vehicle to his guest, where the guest had no control over 
the operator, was held unconstitutional, as repugnant to the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions, because discriminative against persons riding in motor 
vehicles, and denying the equal protection of the law to persons similarly 
situated. Birmingham-Tuscaloosa Ry. & U. Co. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala. 141, 
69 So. 626. 
There are cases, though, where the guest is held guilty of negligence in-
dependently of imputation. Cases involving situations in which driver and 
guest are engaged in a joint undertaking or where the guest is lacking in 
ordinary care either in his choice of driver or in his conduct while being 
driven are often treated as exceptions to the rule against imputing negli-
gence of a driver to his guest. In truth they are hardly exceptions, but 
really instances of independent acts of contributory negligence on the part 
of the guest which preclude a recovery on his part for injuries inflicted upon 
because of the negligence of the driver. 
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Thus it has been held in one case which says that the negligence of the 
driver is imputed to the guest where both are engaged in a joint enterprise, 
in which the transportation is a factor, that to establish a joint adventure 
"the passenger must have either express or implied right to direct the move-
ment of the vehicle used." Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 
90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594. 
The repudiation of the doctrine of imputed negligence, it must be under-
stood, does not excuse the· passenger or guest from exercising any care. 
If he does not exercise such care as a reason~bly prudent man would exer-
cise under the circumstances he cannot recover for injuries occasioned there-
by. Brommer v. Pa. R. Co., 179 Fed. 577, 103 C. C. A. 135. For a discussion 
of the meaning of "due care" see 19 :Kl1cH. L. Rm. 433. In the principal 
Wisconsin case the guest was being sued, and the court finding him guilty 
of no active contributory negligence, absolved him from blame, even though 
he happened in this case to be a part owner of the machine driven by the 
negligent driver. In the earlier Wisconsin cases the court had imputed the 
driver's negligence to the guest on the theory of agency; and if such agency 
view was really sound, the conclusion would be almost inevitable in the prin-
cipal case that the guest was liable. When the agency theory was thus really 
put to the test, the court had to upset some of its earlier doctrine. Most 
generally cases involving the contributory negligence of the guest are those 
in 'Yhich a guest sues a third perso~ -whose negligence, the guest alleges, 
caused the injurie"s sued upon, and the third party interposes the contribu-
tory negligence of driver and guest. 
A guest has been precluded from recovery where the negligent driver oper-
ated the vehicle at excessive speed at the suggestion and directio~ of the 
guest who wanted to arrive at a depot in time to meet a train, Langley v. 
Southern Ry. Co., II3 S. C. 45, 101 S. E. 286; where the guest continued to 
ride with full knowledge of the fact that there were no lights on a car which 
was being driven on unfamiliar roads, Rebillard v, Railroad Co., 216 Fed. 503; 
and where the guest remained in the machine with full knowledge of the 
fact that the driver was so intoxicated as to be unable to operate the ma-
chine properly. Lynn v. Goodwin, (Cal., 1915), 148 Pac. 927. 
All these are really examples of independent negligence on the part of 
the guest. The old doctrine of imputed negligence must now be regarded as 
thoroughly exploded. H. A. A. 
Tm: N~WBJ";RRY CAs~-Senator Newberry of Michigan and sixteen others 
were convicted in the United States District Court on the charge that they 
"unlawfully and feloniously did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree 
together to commit the offense [in the Newberry indictment] on his part 
of wilfully violating the act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, as amended, 
by giving, contributing, expending, and using and by causing to be given, 
contributed, expended and used in procuring his nomination and election at 
said primary and general elections, a greater sum than the laws of Michigan 
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permitted and above ten thousand dollars,'' etc. The Act of Congress re-
f erred to (c. 392, 36 Stat. 822-824, amended c. 33, 37 Stat. 2s-29) commonly 
known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, provides: "No candidate for 
Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall give, 
contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, ex-
pended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election, any 
sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give, 
contribute, expend, or promise under the laws of the state in which he re-
sides," etc. This Act read in connection with the Michigan statute fixed the 
maximum sum so allowed to be expended by a candidate for the United States 
Senate at $3,750. The trial court overruled a demurrer challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Act of Congress. 
On the trial the court (Judge Sessions) charged the jury inter alia as 
follows: 
(c) "To apply these rules to this case: If you are satisfied from 
the evidence that the defendant, Truman H. Newberry at or about 
the time that he became a candidate for United States Senator was 
informed and knew that his campaign for the nomination and election 
would require the expenditure and use of more money than is per-
mitted by law and with such knowledge became a candidate, and 
thereafter by advice, by conduct, by his acts, by his direction, by his 
counsel, or by his procurement he actively participated and took part 
in the expenditure and use of an excessive sum of money, of an un-
lawful sum of money, you will be warranted in finding 'that he did 
violate this statute known as the Corrupt Practices Act." 
In the Supreme Court the Justices were unanimously of the opinion that 
the judgment should be reversed for error in the charge quoted, Chief Jus-
tice White referring to the charge of the trial court as a "grave misappre-
hension and grievous misapplication of the statute." Five members, of the 
Court (McReynolds, Day, McKenna, VanDevanter, and Holmes) were of 
the opinion that the Act of Congress was unconstitutional. The concurrence 
of Mr. Justice McKenna, however, was with the reservation of a possible 
contrary conclusion if the Seventeenth Amendment could be taken into ac-
count. Mr. Justice Pitney delivered an opinion in which Brandeis and Clark, 
]. J., concurred upholding the power of Congress, while the Chief Justice in a 
separate opinion arrived at the same conclusion. Truman. H. Newberry et 
al v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 559, May 2, 1921. 
The fault found in the charge above quoted is succinctly stated by Mr. 
Justice Pitney as follows: 
"However this may be regarded when considered in the abstract, the 
difficulty with it, when viewed in connection with the evidence in the 
case to which the jury was called upon to apply it, is that it permitted 
and perhaps encouraged the jury to find the defendants guilty of a 
conspiracy to violate the Corrupt Practices Act if they merely con-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
templated a campaign requiring the expenditure of money beyond the 
statutory limit even though Mr. Newberry, the candidate, had not, 
and it was not contemplated that he should have, any part in causing 
or procuring such expenditure beyond his mere standing voluntarily 
as a candidate and participating in the campaign with knowledge that 
moneys contributed and expended by others without his participation 
were to be expended. * * * 
"A reading of the entire Act makes it plain that Congress did not 
intend to limit spontaneous contributions of money by others than a 
candidate, nor expenditures of such money except as he should par-
ticipate therein. * * * Spontaneous expenditures by others being with-
out the scope of the prohibition, neither he nor anybody else can be 
held criminally responsible for merely abetting such expenditures. 
"It follows that one's entry upon a candidacy for nomination and 
election as a Senator with knowledge that such candidacy will come 
to naught unless supported by expenditure of money beyond the speci-
fied limit, is not within the inhibition of the Act unless it is contem-
plated that the candidate shall have a part in procuring the excessive 
expenditures beyond the effect of his mere candidacy in evoking spon-
taneous contributions and expenditures by his supporters; and that his 
remaining in the field and participating in the ordinary activities fur-
nish in a general sense the 'occasion' for the expenditure is not to 
be regarded as a 'causing' by the candidate of such expenditure with-
in the meaning of the statute." 
The Court's conclusion on the. interpretation of the Corrupt Practices 
Act and the propriety of ·the charge to the jury are of course interesting and 
important, but by far the most vital part of the case is that dealing with the 
power of Congress to legislate regarding primary elections of candidates for 
the National Legislature. In many of the cases involving constitutional ques-
tions decided by a divided court the differences are due to varying views as 
to economic and social policies and theories. As to these one may agree or 
disagree, but it is pretty difficult to say with assurance that either position is 
wrong. The Newberry case, however, turns on a question which is purely 
one of construction of the Constitution, and it is believed that one is war-
ranted in saying, with all deference, that the majority conclusion is unsound. 
By the Constitution it is provided : "All legislative Power herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives" (Art. I, Sec. I); "The Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places for 
chusing Senators" (Art. I, Sec. 4) ; "The Congress shall have power * * * 
to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Ex-
ecution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Offi-
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cer thereof" (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18). Since Senators are officers of the United 
States and the office exists solely by virtue of the Constitution we assume 
that it would not be seriously questioned, if there were no other provisions 
therein regarding the manner of their selection or limiting the legislative 
power of the Federal Government in respect thereof, that Congress would 
have plenary power over all matters relating to their choice. It has long been 
settled that Congress may provide for the conduct of the election proper. 
Ex parte Siiebold, zoo U. S. 371; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476. 
Regulation of primaries, admittedly of no other purpose than to determine 
whose names shall go on the ballots in the general election, surely would be 
no farther removed from the end to be accomplished than was the creation 
of the bank upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. The classic 
statement by Chief Justice Marshall in that case (p. 421) seems entirely ap-
plicable: ''We think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow 
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which 
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that 
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most bene-
ficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." 
Many cases might be referred to in which Congressional action has been 
upheld where the immediate subject of the legislation was as far or farther 
removed from the subject control over which was vested by the Constitu-
tion in federal hands, as regulation of primaries is removed from a Consti-
tutional provision by which is created the office to be filled. See Second Em-
ployers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I (relations between common carriers and 
their employes); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (registration of 
man power and imposition of compulsory military service) ; United States v. 
Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (punishment of the fraudulent making of spurious 
interstate bills of lading) ; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 254 (prohibition of 
manufacture of non-intoxicating beer). And in In Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 
the provision of section three Article two, that the President "shall take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed" was deemed sufficiently close to 
the matter of protection of United States judges to support the assignment 
of a deputy marshal to protect Mr. Justice Field from the Terrys. 
Is there anything in the Constitution that denies or limits such power of 
Congress? It may be argued that Sec. 4 of Art. I, above quoted, does so. 
Surely there is nothing else that can be relied upon as even tending to up-
hold such a claim. It would seem perfectly apparent, however, that the sec-
tion referred to is a constitutional delegation of power to the states, and 
even that has a string tied to it. Were it not for the fact that five of the 
members of the Supreme Court are of the opinion that Art. I, Sec. 4, is a 
grant of power to Congress, in fact the only basis for any claim by Con-
gress to control even elections of Senators and Representatives; one would 
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feel almost warranted in saying that it was absurd to contend that the sec-
tion was anything other than as above stated. It is the States, not the Fed-
eral Government, that get their power from that section. 
The inherent reasonableness of the view of the minority is apparent when 
it is realized that in truth in a large percentage of the states it is the pri-
mary election, not the general election, that determines who the officers 
shall be. The decision of the majority means that in those states Congress 
is virtually helpless in the control of the selection of its own members. To 
be sure seats may be denied, but at best that is an uncertain remedy, and 
so far as punishment is concerned there can be none-at least so far as Con-
gress is concerned-except in such denial of a seat. 
